White men with guns: a thorough examination of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan
October 23, 2007
Dave Markland

The current incarnation of the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan began in February of 2006, and followed earlier military commitments that began in the fall of 2001. Now operating mainly under NATO command as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the array of Canadian Forces' roles has several notable aspects, some of which overlap: about 1200 troops make up the Canadian battle group headquartered at Kandahar Airfield, along with several hundred support personnel; over 100 soldiers comprise the bulk of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) based out Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City; the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (“omelette”), which embeds with and trains Afghan troops; and the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) which is embedded with various Afghan government ministries in Kabul. In total, some 2500 personnel make up the conventional forces deployed in Afghanistan. Additionally, an unknown number of JTF-2 special forces work alongside special forces from the US and other countries as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Very little is known about their role.

With a few exceptions, media coverage of the mission has been generally sympathetic to the claims and actions of Canadian military officials. It is the purpose of this essay to shed light on the less-reported aspects of the mission, about which our military and government officials rarely speak.

The spectacle at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) seems reminiscent of the bar scene in Star Wars. An enormous, Russian-built complex, KAF sits on the edge of the vast desert in southern Afghanistan which straddles the border with Pakistan amidst Pashtun territory. Journalists describe a steady of flow of soldiers from several countries, many of whom are off-limits to reporters. American and Canadian special forces, for instance, cannot be interviewed or even mentioned by the press. And those troops may not be the only ones keeping a low profile, as "a senior British officer said there last autumn that he was convinced the Taliban had many spies on the base".1

Apart from the multinational tutoring in special ops and media relations, there may be other important skills being disseminated at KAF. A Norwegian newspaper caused a stir early this year when it reported on sworn testimony by several US interrogators who had worked at the base and described some of the goings-on, including the widespread use of torture.2

The mission of the Canadian Forces is of a type which is wholly new to them, and seriously at odds with what many feel is the traditional role of our forces - i.e. peacekeeping. A Globe and Mail editorial marks the shift: the "new era of peacemaking", we are told, demands "pitched battles over a few metres of road".3 Others are not so quick to put on kid gloves when describing the mission. Scott Taylor, editor of Canadian military magazine Esprit de Corps, skips the linguistic niceties and describes Canadian troops in Afghanistan simply as "occupying forces".4

How do soldiers themselves view their task? "Hours of boredom and then an intense moment of adrenaline," says one 25-year-old Canadian Forces gunner. "One fellow compares the subliminally percussive sensation to sex", relates a Toronto Star reporter.5 Another soldier reports vengeance and geopolitics as his motivator: "I have absolutely no problem killing them," asserts a battle group sergeant. "They started this on September 11. We're just bringing the fight back to them".6

Indeed, many soldiers have taken up their tasks with gusto. Others, meanwhile, have been disappointed when the fight wasn't as hot as they expected. Shortly after arrival in Kandahar, members of the Van Doos regiment "étaient un peu frustrés de participer à une mission de reconstruction et auraient préféré combattre à leur arrivée en Afghanistan." ("were a little frustrated to be taking part in a reconstruction mission and would have preferred to fight upon their arrival in Afghanistan").7

If all this Rambo-style readiness sounds to some like an echo of American military bravado, there may be good reason for it. Working in close quarters with their US counterparts seems to have caused a certain mindset to rub off on Canadian officers, exemplified by NATO spokesman James Appathurai. "NATO forces have the right and the responsibility to protect their mission," asserts the former employee of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. "That includes the right -- and indeed, if the commander deems it necessary -- the responsibility to take pre-emptive action".8

One of the key tools in Canada's version of "peacemaking", the British-made M777 Howitzer gun, which can shoot 6 inch-diameter bullets a distance of 30km (22 miles), has reportedly been dubbed the “Desert dragon” by insurgent fighters. Acquired by the Canadian Forces in the fall of 2005, the weapon has gained a devoted fan base among military brass. "When the infantry, for example, come up against a couple of houses where they would suffer casualties going in and clearing that house of the enemy, even though they would win, it's sort of nice to be able to stand back and turn to the tanker and say, 'Take that house out.'" So explained retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, who has been doing near full-time public relations for the war.9 Afghan bystanders, ceaselessly endangered by NATO operations, might disagree with MacKenzie that the experience is "sort of nice".

Getting into the spirit of things, the Globe and Mail's Gloria Galloway extols the benefits of the M777: "They are a good negotiation tool; in trying to persuade Afghans not to help the Taliban, Canadians can demonstrate the consequences of bad behaviour by radioing to a launcher many kilometres away, and suddenly the Afghan farmer is left with a large hole in his field and a new appreciation of NATO firepower".10 Galloway seems to be using the word "negotiation" in a technical sense; others less skilled in journalism or public relations might use words like "extortion" or "coercion".

The use of the long-distance "negotiating tool", combined with "close air support" (CAS), underlines the sometimes cautious, circumspect nature of NATO's presence in southern Afghanistan. Indeed, various media have reported on the hide-and-seek nature of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. "The U.S. and NATO forces only venture out to conduct special operations. Routine patrolling and intelligence gathering is the responsibility of the nascent Afghan National Army," writes John Cherian. Further, he asserts that "loyalty of the Afghan Security Forces cannot be taken for granted... For instance, General Bismillah Khan, Chief of Staff of the Afghan National Army, is a former warlord".11

Writing from Helmand province, the Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith remarks that "British troops were effectively under siege at their patrol base in Sangin [Helmand province] last year".12 And this fact isn't winning many friends for the foreign forces: "Those foreign [expletive deleted] say there is security - it’s a lie," charged one Afghan army commander. "They don’t risk their asses out here. There are Taleban right in the district centre, but the British and the Americans stay in their holes".13

While Canadian soldiers appear to have been spared such disparaging accusations, it is worth noting the disproportionate share of risk alloted to Afghan forces. Afghan army and police officers accompanying NATO troops sustain about 90% of the total combat injuries.14

So what is an occupying army, huddled behind the wire, supposed to do? Well, if you are NATO then you go ahead and pay some trustworthy locals to fight for you. That is, you hire mercenaries. Under the headline, "British hire anti-Taliban mercenaries", the Times of London reports on "newly formed tribal police who will be recruited by paying a higher rate than the Taliban."15

Canadian forces, too, are getting in on the action. "For five years Col. Toorjan, a turbaned, tough-as-nails, 33-year-old soldier, has been working alongside U.S. and Canadian forces in Afghanistan as a paid mercenary commander," reports Canada's National Post. "Today, his militia force of 60 Afghan fighters guards Camp Nathan Smith, the Canadian provincial reconstruction team site (PRT) in Kandahar, and guides Canadian soldiers on their patrols outside the base." Toorjan and his armed men "wield significant influence in Kandahar's complex security web", making him a treasured ally, though before 9/11 he was "in effect a warlord", said the second-in-command of Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team.16

In the current situation, it is largely American aircraft which carry out air assaults. (The British, French, Germans and others have also committed aircraft, which are largely used in transport or surveillance.) Called "close air support" (CAS), these war planes are routinely called in by ground forces when they locate insurgent fighters. The CAS might deliver bombs, missiles, shells or simply a "show of force" to destroy or deter those fighters. But these attacks are a blunt instrument, and civilian casualties are a frequent consequence. "[P]ushing into insurgent-held territory", writes Terri Judd of the Independent, "increases the danger of civilian casualties, especially when outnumbered troops call in air strikes".17

The results of this type of assault have been a humanitarian and public relations disaster for NATO and US forces. “NATO’s tactics are increasingly endangering the civilians that they are supposed to be protecting, and turning the local population against them,” observed Sam Zia-Zarifi, the Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch.18 Yet the foreign forces appear to have expended little effort to ameliorate the situation, as the rate of air attacks through the summer and into the fall of 2007 demonstrate: Close air support missions have been launched at a remarkably steady rate of about 40 per day.

The sheer danger of these air operations has not been lost on international observers on the ground. Human rights expert and UN official in Afghanistan Javier Leon Diaz, responding to concerns over mounting civilian casualties, expressed his opinion that NATO/US air attacks may constitute a "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions.19 Here, Diaz no doubt refers to Article 51 of the 1977 Protocols, which bans "indiscrimate" attacks, defined as attacks which harm civilians and/or civilian objects "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

While western military officials repeatedly affirm their desire to protect the Afghan population, at least one account indicates that NATO efforts to avoid causing harm to civilians are less than vigorous. Canadian military historian Sean Maloney, writing in Maclean's magazine, describes a nighttime attack by Canadian Forces in Kandahar province: "Canadian artillery thundered to cut off and destroy the escaping enemy. Little was left to chance: troops knew the enemy had depopulated the area so there was little fear of civilian casualties."20 Note that if Maloney's account is accurate, Canadian troops relied on Taliban fighters to ensure the battleground was free of civilians.

Armed confrontations aren't the only situations where civilian lives are put at risk, for "sometimes all it takes to be labelled a terrorist is a smart turban and pocketful of Pakistan cash", remarks journalist Richard Foot. Foot writes of witnessing one such incident where a suspect was fruitlessly interrogated and finally let go. "For two hours, Canadians questioned, cursed at and threatened their suspect in search of answers," he writes. "They bound his wrists and turned him over to the small unit of Afghan army troops who had accompanied the Canadians".21

Sometimes Canadian troops go beyond curses and threats, according to correspondent Graeme Smith of the Globe and Mail. Smith's April 2007 dispatches, featuring a series of testimonials by Afghan prisoners, sparked what has been called the "torture scandal" by Canadian media; the term denotes torture of suspected Taliban by Afghan security forces, which caused quite a stir. But none of the barrage of commentary which followed from his reports made mention of possible abuse by Canadian soldiers. One of Smith's sources makes precisely that accusation, however faintly: "Tila Mohammed, 18, said Canadians detained him at a farmhouse where he had been living and working as a labourer for a wealthy landowner. He claimed the Canadians kicked him a little as he was being detained, but added that the troops later helped him stay cool in the late summer heat by spraying him with water."22

A similar lack of outcry greeted a pair of incidents nearly a year earlier. Following an August 2006 suicide bombing in Kandahar City which killed one Canadian soldier, Afghan journalists "reported being fired upon by the Canadians when they tried to capture video and pictures at the bombing site", according to the Canadian Press. But the attacked journalists were the lucky ones that day, as a young Afghan boy was shot dead by jittery Canadian troops who had recently begun their mission in the country.23 However, the deputy commander of the Canadian mission assured everyone that the tragic incident was not the result of inexperience: "Initial impressions right now are the soldiers did what they had to do," commented Col. Fred Lewis.24

An American army lieutenant who along with his unit was mentoring Canadian Forces soldiers in Panjwaii explains his experiences pursuing the Taliban: "The problem was, that's where they lived. A lot of them, we'd kill them and their house was only 10 metres away."25 Evidently, some insurgents have even infiltrated the Afghan government and security forces. "The ministry of interior police that we use to secure ourselves in the day become the Taliban at night," explains Stephen Appleton, the leader of a UN road construction project. "We don't know who all the bad guys are, but they have penetrated everything from the government infrastructure to our own organizations who we deal with in the daytime in terms of business. They are easily working against us at night."26

So what about local people who don't moonlight as insurgents, how are they regarded by the foreign forces? Well for starters they receive a close-up lesson in peace. "We've warned people they may see soldiers shooting in their villages. I tell them this is the price of peace and freedom," explained an American Lieutenant-Colonel.27 For their part, Afghan civilians themselves seem less than enthusiastic about the foreign forces. Local people often cannot (or don't care to) distinguish the forces of individual countries of the NATO operation, referring to them all as "white guys with guns," according to one correspondent.28

US and NATO forces in turn make their own generalizations concerning Afghans civilians in the form of collective punishment. In Kunar province, where American forces claim to be fighting Al Qaeda, counter-insurgency tactics amount to a direct attack on civilians. According to ABC News, US military units there employed "a new tactic - sanctions" which are aimed at residents of the Korangal Valley, who are open supporters of the insurgency. These locals, mostly subsistence farmers, endured a blockade on essential items such as sugar, tea and cooking oil.29 But the blockade of the Korangal wasn't limited to staple goods. A Himalayan Times correspondent spoke to one local who explained their predicament: "[W]e cannot even go to the hospital as the forces have blocked the road to the south of the valley. We cannot move our lumber which is our main source of sustenance".30

Captain Hansen, commander of the American unit involved, explained the brutal logic of the blockade: "They are going to need all those things that make their lives just a little bit better. We are providing them with the hard decision. Either you work with the government of Afghanistan or you have the effects of not working with them. It's in their court."31

The tactic of collective punishment is a part of the Canadian arsenal as well. "Any people that are found to have been helping the Taliban will have their houses seized by the government, their property seized. They will be left with nothing," promised Lieut. Craig Alcock, a Canadian platoon commander.32 This statement aroused zero commentary. Yet, as numerous reports indicate, civilians "helping the Taliban" are often doing so against their will. And this concern is prior to the question of whether this threat, if carried out, would violate Geneva Convention prohibitions against collective punishment. Article 33 of the Fourth Convention (1949) says, in part: "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed."

"Canadian soldiers block exits on either side of a village, while Afghan army soldiers, backed up by Canadians, slowly advance through the community, searching homes and peering down back lanes. Suspects are searched and questioned. If grounds for suspicion are uncovered -- pockets full of batteries and Pakistani rupees, or evidence the suspect has recently fired a gun -- the suspect is arrested and turned over to Afghan authorities." That's how Canadian Press reporter Bob Weber describes one of the Canadian Forces' "squeegee-like manoeuvres" to "cleanse" the Taliban from the Zhari and Panjwaii districts of Kandahar.33

In Kandahar City, meanwhile, Canadian troops insisted upon regular searches of a cemetery despite being forbidden from entering the grounds as are all non-Muslims. In any case, the cemetery was used as a staging ground for a botched suicide attack despite (or maybe because of) the periodic military presence.34

Other accounts similarly reveal serious public relations problems encountered by the Canadian Forces. "While the Canadians think their relationship with the people of Gumbad is somewhat cordial, villagers are quick to say that they are deeply offended by the use of bomb-sniffing dogs," according to a Vancouver Sun report.35 The same reporter describes a "show of force patrol" in a different village in the same district. The patrol sought intelligence from locals following an attack on Canadian forces. Evidently the “force” brought some measure of progress: "One village elder was pretty shaken, but they've given us a couple of leads to pursue," explained Major Kirk Gallinger of the Canadian Forces.36

It is small wonder that seasoned observers of Afghanistan give NATO a failing grade on the project to win hearts and minds. "What they have failed to do is make allies of Afghans. Instead they have made enemies of ordinary Afghans," says Kathy Gannon, a veteran reporter on Afghanistan, commenting on the Canadian mission.  In response to increased insurgent attacks, she observes, troops have "gone from having an idealistic idea of what they want to do, to being terribly frightened."37

A journalist from the London Times, accompanying Canadian Forces soldiers for part of Operation Medusa, offers a revealing glimpse of combat in Kandahar province. "Throughout the day soldiers on foot combed the area for rebels. Heavy gates to walled compounds were blown open, a warren of Taleban tunnels and bunkers were destroyed by explosives and grenades were thrown into wells and fired through doors," writes Tim Albone.38 Similarly, the Toronto Star's correspondent observed Canadian light armored vehicles (LAVs) driving over dikes and destroying them while another dispatch describes a Canadian soldier "who boasts of driving his LAV through walls and shooting down telephone poles with a 25mm chain gun".39

Assuming these reports are true then here again, Canadian forces may be in breach of the law. Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (1977) states: "Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Unlike the case of the mercenary convention cited above, Canada has ratified the Protocol. (The US, however, has not.)

While more than two million Afghans currently reside in Pakistan and Iran as refugees, often overlooked are the tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country. The lack of attention which our media gives to this problem is perhaps explained by the fact that Canada has played a big role in producing those IDPs. Indeed, two and a half months after Operation Medusa, reported to be NATO's largest operation of 2006, Amnesty International was "particularly concerned" that air strikes as part of NATO campaigns had displaced up to 90,000 people. The most serious clashes at that time were in Kandahar and Helmand provinces.40

Months later, Canadian and NATO officials, with great fanfare, announced the arrival of a trickle of returnees to the districts where Canadian troops operate. However, few observers suggest that IDPs are returning home in great numbers. By July 2007 the Senlis Council's Edward McCormick was dismissive of the claims of military officials:"The claim that 6,000 families went back to their homes - I think that's false... I can tell you the internally displaced camps are growing rapidly."41

Yet the thousands who fled Panjwaii and Zhari during Operation Medusa may have considered themselves lucky, as an unknown number of civilians could not escape to safety. Reporting at the outset of that battle, the Globe and Mail's correspondent wrote that "those who are lingering are either farmers who won't abandon their crops or are too poor to find shelter elsewhere.42

In light of such unsavory happenings, it's not surprising that Canadian military officials have tried to paint their role in Afghanistan as one supportive of democracy and development. They are thus quick to boast of the numerous shuras (councils) which Canadian troops initiate in their areas of operation. The supposed purpose of these meetings is to hear what local (male) elders want from NATO forces. (It is also an opportunity for intelligence gathering, as Afghans are well aware.) The military is particularly keen for direction on quick impact development projects, often carried out by the PRT. On assignment in Kandahar over the Christmas holiday, the Toronto Star’s Oakland Ross witnessed a shura. His account is revealing:

Ross' description verges on the absurd as the press-ganged elders "professed to oppose the Taliban, to repudiate its values, and to welcome foreign troops" present in their country. The dubiousness of the scene is obvious to Ross as well as at least one member of the military brass: "'What would you do?' one Canadian officer said later. 'You're a poor guy who just wants to hold his family together. What would you do?' You would probably say whatever you thought the men with the rifles wanted you to say."43

A similar concern with democratic form rather than democratic substance is seen in another reporter's account of a shura held a few months after the one Ross witnessed. A soldier with the Kandahar PRT "moves the shura along when it threatens to get bogged down in the wrangling of village interests", writes Rosie DiManno. "If you can't achieve consensus, I will simply look at the district leader and ask him to move forward," explains Sergeant Jason Henry. "For all the consultation," observes DiManno, "ultimately a district elder will cut through the conflicting agendas".44

However, scarcely a word was said by officials or commentators in response to the Canadian military's known involvement in destroying marijuana plants - presumably someone's livelihood - in Afghanistan. A widely-circulated report in the fall of 2006 related a tale of Canadian soldiers struggling to operate in an area where insurgents could take cover in fields of 10-foot cannabis plants. The plantations, some of which were burned, were able to withstand attempts to ignite them using diesel and white phosphorus.45

In any case, opium eradication continues apace, with effects that should concern anyone who hopes to see improvements in the lot of the Afghan populace. As Canadian UN official Chris Alexander explained to journalist Jon Lee Anderson, “In Helmand and Uruzgan, eradication has been subject to political manipulation and corruption. It has also proven virtually impossible to conduct in districts where the Taliban are relatively strong, thereby inevitably penalizing farmers in pro-government districts”. Anderson also cites officials who told him that eradication efforts often spare the crops of politically well-connected tribes (such as President Karzai's Populzai tribe) while targeting less-fortunate tribes - thus driving these tribes into armed opposition to the foreign forces.46

Anyone who reads the foregoing as a description of impending (or ongoing) humanitarian disaster would not be alone. Indeed, serious and sober international observers of the conflict have offered their own damning assessments of the NATO/US role in Afghanistan. A major report from the United Nations Development Program released in 2005 includes a harsh assessment of the role of foreign military forces in the country. "The privatization of security and the spread of a military mentality,” the authors conclude, “has led to a climate of fear, intimidation, terror and lawlessness in many parts of Afghanistan."47 Similarly, a report prepared earlier this year by a Canadian Senate standing committee makes a bold assertion about Canada's effect on life in Kandahar province - and one that suggests a simple solution: "Life is clearly more perilous because we are there," the report concludes.48 Such is Canada's contribution to the new Great Game.

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